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DISCLOSURE VERSUS
CONFIDENTIALITY
RICHARD D. KUHN*
One of the most controversial topics in legal ethics is canon four, the
ethical canon requiring the confidentiality of an attorney.' Neither law-
yers nor the general public are satisfied with the guidelines promulgated
by the Bar in this area.2
In the past, arguments concerning canon four have been lively. The
House of Delegates for the American Bar Association and the Federation
* Member of the firm Holcka, Donahue & Kuhn, P.C.; L.L.B. Columbia University, 1958;
L.L.M. Taxation, Georgetown University, 1963.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980). The present canon on
confidentiality, applicable in New York, states:
DR 4-101 Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the profes-
sional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third
person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only
after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by
law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself
or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates,
and others whose services are utilized by him from disclosing or using confidences or
secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal the information allowed by DR 4-
101(C) through an employee.
Id.
I See Taylor, Of Lawyers, Ethics and Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1983, at F4, col. 3;
Taylor, Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1983, §1 (Magazine), at 31.
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of New York State Judges believe that the present canon four results in
lawyers' excessive involvement in immoral behavior of clients, and the
stage is now set for debate in each state as to whether the applicable
canon will be changed, as recommended by the American Bar Association.
To evaluate and understand the limitations of the canon, its philosophical
objectives must be identified. This requires, in turn, an analysis of the
role lawyers play in civilized society. It should be obvious that canon four
cannot be justified merely to establish a comfortable relationship between
lawyers and clients without meeting the additional standard of assuring
that the particular practices of lawyers that the canon justifies serve an
appropriate social function.3
It is a purpose of this Article to suggest some considerations that
previous debates concerning the canon have not addressed. A major con-
cept is that the solution may lie in first recognizing that it is impossible
for a single canon to provide proper guidelines for all lawyers, because
there are two qualitatively different levels of practice, each requiring dif-
ferent ethical principles. As long as one canon is operative with respect to
all areas of practice there will be irreconcilable inconsistencies between
proper morality and effective legal practice in a variety of situations. The
inevitable logical extension of this premise is that there must be two dis-
tinct rules operating in the distinct areas of practice. Indeed, the adver-
sary system of judicial resolution of controversies serves a well recognized
function, and justifies certain canons which enable it to operate effec-
tively.' However, this justification may not be appropriate in those areas
of practice not involving litigation or other controversy, such as business
negotiation, securities, and corporate law, in which society reasonably de-
mands different behavior.'
Historically, it has been presumed that an adversary system imple-
mented by the legal profession is the best method of judicial resolution of
controversies. 6 This presumption reflects the notion that human nature is
not perfect. Given a conflict, a person cannot be relied upon always to
speak the truth or to conduct himself at the highest level of morality. It is
presumed that the more fundamental motivation in such a setting is the
survival instinct. Given a conflict between a person's perception of his
" See Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VILL. L. REV. 279, 331-
33 (1963).
" See, Lawry, Lying, Confidentiality, and the Adversary System of Justice, 1977 UTAH L.
REv. 653, 654-65. "Certainly truth will not always be achieved by a one-sided investigation
into the 'facts' . . . . It takes the cutting edge of dialogue, the thrust and parry of two
intellects in vital exchange, in order to crystallize a question and distill an answer." Id. at
655.
6 See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972).
' See 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2291 (3d ed. 1940).
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material or bodily self interest on the one hand, and his commitment to
truth or unquestionably moral behavior on the other hand, the presump-
tion is that in litigation he will often elect to compromise the latter.
It is a fundamental strength of our system of justice that it recog-
nizes this basic aspect of human nature and is consequently organized to
take it into account. In the administration of justice it is the adversary
system that has been constructed to deal with this aspect of human na-
ture. It is not presumed that each side will always tell the truth. Rather,
it is presumed that in pursuance of self-interest a litigant may not tell the
truth or may tell a distorted version of the truth. Given this problem, in
litigation procedure it is assumed that the best solution is for each party
to present its conception of the truth and for the trier of fact to be the
final arbiter. 7
To represent their clients zealously, attorneys are expected to exploit
this system. Obviously however, there must be rules and principles by
which lawyers must act within the adversary system and this has been the
classic function of the canon of ethics.
The dual purpose of canon four has been to establish standards of
moral professional behavior and to permit a method by which lawyers can
be effective in an adversary setting.
In defining the lawyer's position in the adversary system, virtually
absolute sanctity has been accorded to the right of confidentiality. The
privilege of confidentiality, founded on both the law of evidence and the
law of agency, has few exceptions. ' These exceptions principally relate to
disclosure of an avowed intention to commit a crime likely to result in
serious bodily harm. 9 For example, a recent opinion by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York asserted that an attorney must not re-
veal to an opposing attorney the fraud of a client's representation that he
owned certain property and had executed mortgages and notes upon
which the client's action was based. While there are varied interpretations
See Lawry, supra note 4, at 656.
8 See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at §§ 2290-2291.
9 See Hawkins v. Kings County, 24 Wash. App. 338, 602 P.2d 361 (1979) (dictum). The
Hawkins case addresses the issue of whether an attorney had a duty to warn his client's
mother that the client might be dangerous when released from confinement, even though
the mother was already aware of the risk. The court found that there was no duty to dis-
close, since the attorney received no information from the client that the client intended to
assault anyone. "We believe that the duty of counsel to be loyal to his client and to re-
present zealously his client's interest overrides the nebulous and unsupported theory that
our rules and ethical code mandate disclosure of information which counsel considers detri-
mental to his client's stated interest." Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSI-
BILITY DR 4-101(c)(3) (permitting a lawyer to reveal "[tihe intention of his client to commit
a crime . ").
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by commentators,1" the privilege has been extended questionably by some
to permit a lawyer to elicit testimony from a client even when he has
reason to believe the testimony is perjured. Monroe Freedman, Dean of
Hofstra Law School and author of a well-known book on legal ethics, has
advocated some forms of deception even in the courtroom:
The criminal defense attorney, however unwillingly in terms of personal
morality, has a professional responsibility as an advocate in an adversary
system to examine the perjurious client in the ordinary way and to argue to
the jury, as evidence in the case, the testimony presented by the
defendant.1
If a lawyer has a client who commits perjury, Professor Freedman
contends, an attorney has the professional responsibility to ask questions
that do not contest this testimony and even to use the false testimony in
making the best case for the client to the court and the jury. Undoubt-
edly, this can involve lying, 2 and such instances are not uncommon in
actual practice. 13 Perjury has traditionally been abhorred more than
other forms of lying, and yet, perjury has come to be enthusiastically de-
fended, albeit by a minority of commentators. Defended, moreover, not
just as a regrettable practice at times excusable, but actually as part of
one's professional responsibility as an attorney.
Despite its questionable use and abuse by some attorneys, it is not
the purpose of this Article to criticize the classic function of the canon of
confidentiality as used in the adversary system. Rather, an important ob-
jective of this Article is to establish that there is a different level, apart
from the adversary systems at which lawyers operate. This level involves
clients of a different disposition in a moral setting unlike that found in
the adversarial world, and as such, lawyers involved at this level of prac-
tice should be expected to answer to a much higher standard of moral
behavior.
It is a phenomenon perhaps unique to the commercially productive
western world that there has developed a widely followed business ethic
based upon trust, reliability, soundness of product and other moral values
of a high order. Of course, throughout the world lip service is paid to such
principles. However, in the productive commercial countries, there is ac-
tually a significant element of the business community that adheres to
these values. It is arguable that adherence to trustworthiness is the cata-
" Compare Gardner, supra note 3 with M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM (1975).
11 S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 158-59 (1978) (quoting M.
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 40-41 (1975)).
" See Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L.
Riv. 1485, 1488 (1966).
" See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 40-41.
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lyst that allows the economic system to function effectively in the com-
mercially profitable countries, as compared with the countries in the
western world whose economies have not flourished despite promising po-
tential. In contrast, it is revealing that in the stagnant economies of the
western world there tends to be profound mistrust in the business com-
munity. Corruption, kickbacks, and the assumption that the person with
whom one is dealing is likely to cheat characterize commercial dealings.
Anyone with substantial experience in business dealings in the economi-
cally stagnant countries cannot fail to be impressed by the pervasiveness
of business dishonesty. Certainly in the United States today, an impor-
tant portion of the business community has come to recognize that pros-
perity in business dealings depends fundamentally upon a reputation for
honest dealings and reliability. Such businessmen tend to seek not only
the highest business morality for themselves and those with whom they
do business, but also from their counsel and other representatives. In
such a context the highest moral behavior by members of the bar be-
comes not only desirable in an abstract sense, but highly practical. It is
reasonable at this level of practice to impose on practitioners a standard
that differs qualitatively from the standard appropriate when there is an
adversarial resolution of problems. It is therefore apparent that in a con-
text in which the adversary system must be relied upon to solve
problems, the standard for practitioners must be different from a context
in which mutual cooperation, honesty, and total reliance upon good faith
dominate. This is particularly appropriate with respect to the issue of dis-
closure versus confidentiality.
The highly publicized case of In re 0. P. M. Leasing Services Inc."
presents in microcosm the conflicting dynamics involving the confidenti-
ality canon. O.P.M. Leasing Company, Inc. engaged in a number of fraud-
ulent leasing arrangements involving non-existent equipment, artificial
inflation of values, and bribery. The victims were the investing public,
pension funds, and almost every party with which the company con-
ducted business. At a certain point, the law firm that represented the
company had reason to know of the fraudulent activities. The attorneys
retained expert counsel to advise them as to their responsibilities under
the canons. The attorneys for O.P.M. were advised that they could con-
tinue to engage in additional transactions for the company pending ef-
forts to discover details of illegality, and that they were bound to keep
information already learned confidential. When they finally decided to re-
sign, the firm was asked by the incoming counsel whether there were any
14 See In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), a/i'd, 670 F.2d 383
(2d Cir. 1982); Taylor, The O.P.M. Fraud: Report Faults Many, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1983,
at D1, col. 5; Taylor, Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1983, §1
(Magazine), at 31.
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questionable practices by the client of which new counsel should be
aware, and there was no disclosure of the situation. The new counsel pro-
ceeded unwittingly and provided representation in additional fraudulent
transactions.
The result of this interpretation of the canon was that the law firm
continued representation despite significant reason to be on notice of the
probability of substantial fraud. The justification for continuing represen-
tation appears to have been that only if there was absolute knowledge of
ongoing fraud would there be a compulsion to resign. 6 There was no obli-
gation imposed to investigate obvious possibilities that counsel was par-
ticipating in a continuing fraudulent situation. Instead, the firm's desire
to continue to receive substantial legal fees was satisfied by reliance pri-
marily on the absolute sanctity of the confidentiality canon.
The 0. P. M. case permits the best possible setting in which to con-
sider the confidentiality canon. If one were about to choose an area in
which lawyers and clients should be bound by a requirement of absolute
disclosure, it would be in matters involving the investing public. Simi-
larly, such an obligation should exist in presentations for bank financing.
The decision helped refocus attention on the proper balance between dis-
closure and confidentiality in various circumstances. Lack of significant
restriction on confidentiality is being questioned,16 because there is un-
easiness that disclosure was prevented in circumstances in which it was
obviously an essential requirement,17 such as the area of public
investment.
Protection of consumers and the investing public is largely a twenti-
eth century development. It is a creation of statutory enactment and
evolution in judicial decisions. There has developed a highly sophisticated
set of doctrines which afford public protection by imposing requirements
of accountability, disclosure and due diligence by lawyers to an extent not
known in previous centuries. Rules regarding confidentiality in the legal
profession have not evolved correspondingly. Accountability, disclosure,
and due diligence as imposed by statutes and court decisions are under-
mined if lawyers and clients can operate in a conspiracy of silence. Confi-
dentiality in an adversary system is an ancient concept." Its proper
evolution in accord with twentieth century developments has been re-
"5 Cf. Hawkins v. Kings County, 24 Wash. App. 338, 602 P.2d 361 (1979) (attorney had no
duty to disclose information of potential violence of client when client himself did not tell
attorney that client may be violent).
* Id; see also Noonan, supra note 12, at 1492.
" See Note, Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege Upon Voluntary Disclosure
to the SEC, 50 FoRDHAm L. RzV. 963 (1982).
19 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2290, at 549; Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALw. L. Rzy. 1061, 1069-84 (1978).
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sisted unduly by the Bar.' 9
The areas of protection of consumers and the investing public are not
the only areas in which disclosure and forthrightness are accepted as fun-
damental requirements. A significant portion of the successful business
community 0 and lawyers who serve them expect as much in the areas of
contract negotiations, business acquisitions, commercial leasing, testa-
mentary planning and real property transactions. Thus, the ethic of re-
sponsible disclosure is not a utopian ideal, but is a widely accepted prin-
ciple to which canons of professional ethics should attempt to conform.
The proposed rule as adopted by the American Bar Association's House
of Delegates at its 1983 meeting is consistent with this view. Essentially,
the new rule requires withdrawal if the lawyer's services are being em-
ployed by the client to commit fraud. Further, the rule permits the law-
yer to inform a court of the withdrawal and to withdraw or disaffirm any
opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. Since the rule is binding on
practitioners only if adopted by the highest courts or legislatures of their
states, debate at the state level will certainly take place in the near fu-
ture. It is submitted that the proposal should be considered in the con-
text that it would apply in limited areas of practice, while at the same
time strict confidentiality would prevail in other areas of practice. A ma-
jor source of resistance to the new proposal has been from the trial bar.
The restriction of the new standard to non-litigated or non-adversary sit-
uations would perhaps eliminate resistance by the trial bar, and would be
justified by the concepts described earlier in the Article.
In considering dual standards, it is certainly easy to point out many
of the conflicts that could arise in the ambiguous twilight zones that all
lawyers are equipped to imagine. The fact that there are ambiguous areas,
and that precise rules are hard to establish for all situations, should not
prevent definition of two fundamentally different conceptual areas. Confi-
dentiality could be virtually absolute when employed within the adver-
sary system, the purpose for which it was conceived." This would apply,
for example, in litigation. The broader disclosure responsibilities would
be applicable in the areas of consumer and investment protection and the
similar areas described above, when either by statute or current prevail-
ing business morality society already is demanding such behavior by the
public and its counsel.22
"o See N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1983 at Al, col. 2 (reporting vote of American Bar Association
Congress against disclosure by attorney of fraudulent activity on part of his client).
10 Business and Ethics, 62 PERSONNEL J. 604 (1983); Haeg, Sources of International Busi-
ness Ethics, 23 MGMT. INT'L REV. 73 (1983).
" See Prizel v. Karelsen, 74 F.R.D. 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d
186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975).
gg See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
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The English Solicitor/Barrister dichotomy suggests one method of di-
viding areas of practice."3 Notwithstanding the traditional reluctance of
the Bar to recognize areas of specialty, the direction in the future will
likely be towards recognizing and licensing special areas, as has been done
in medicine and dentistry. This may produce a redefinition of distinctive
areas of practice that could conform to distinctive ethical systems.
The theory of a "limited waiver" has been suggested as a useful solu-
tion.2 " The theory deals with the strict standard of waiver normally ap-
plied to the attorney-client privilege, and whether this waiver can be re-
laxed in a particular context-that involving cooperation with the SEC in
a non-public investigation through the disclosure of otherwise privileged
material. The term "limited waiver" contemplates that the privilege is
waived only as to the SEC, and remaining in force and effect as to the
rest of the world. Several decisions have already supported the principle
that important public policy is served in certain situations by relaxing the
waiver standard.25 Such relaxation has already been contemplated by the
courts, for example, in disclosures in joint defense 2 accounting situa-
tions,' 7 settlement negotiations,2 and in expediting complex discovery.29
The argument in favor of a limited waiver is based on the perception
that relaxation of the strict standard of confidentiality will serve the im-
REP.(CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972).
23 See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 105 (explaining this dichotomy).
See Note, supra note 17.
"' See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978)(en banc); Brynes v..
IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 687-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (courts found "limited waiver"
with respect to disclosure of information from SEC investigations).
" See, e.g., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th
Cir. 1977). It is stretching the holding of the case to say that a waiver standard has been
relaxed; rather, the court wanted more definite information as to whether the present con-
troversy was similar to the prior case. If matters in the two cases were similar, then there
would be an attorney-client privilege of confidentiality Id.; see also Hanydee v. United
States, 355 F.2d 183, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1965) (admission by defendant made to his attorney is
privileged and should not be introduced at trial, even though admission may influence posi-
tion of co-defendant's attorney); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 600-12 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (defendant corporation can assert privilege in action to discover materials generated
by corporation's attorneys in the course of SEC investigation); Transmirra Prod. Corp. v.
Monsanto Chem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 572, 576-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (information about defense
strategy of previous third party defendants privileged, thus, immune from disclosure).
"7 See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
" See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 373 (E.D. Wis.
1979); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 45 (D. Md. 1974); American Optical
Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431 (D. Mass. 1972); International Bus. Machs..
Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968).
" See Permian Corp. v. United States, 32 FED. R. Evm. Sanv. 2d (Callaghan) 429 (D.D.C.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Champion Int'l Corp. v. Inter-
national Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 1980); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70
F.R.D. 508, 515 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976).
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portant policy of encouraging cooperation with the SEC. 0 Although the
theory dealt solely with the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality
in a specific context, a valid principle of broader implication has been
suggested. To the extent that there are strong policy reasons for an ethi-
cal standard that requires an attorney to forego absolute client confiden-
tiality in a certain context, this may be achieved without destroying the
legitimate need for complete confidentiality in an adversarial context. It
is certainly possible to conceive that the use of the limited waiver concept
would permit two distinct areas of practice suggested above to develop
with different rules as to confidentiality.
CONCLUSION
Although the twentieth century has witnessed some of the worst deg-
radations of civilization and disasters in human behavior, it has also pro-
duced enormous progress with respect to higher standards of civilized
morality and responsibility. New definitions of public accountability and
disclosure obligations reflect a morality not structured in earlier centu-
ries. Are lawyers to be the promoters or the resistors of this morality?
The adversary system of judicial administration represented a great
social advance over trial by combat and ordeal by fire. Will not higher
moral standards of public responsibility and disclosure represent a simi-
larly great advance in areas of consumer protection, investment protec-
tion and business ethics over adversarial morality in these contexts?
Are lawyers like any other agent, or are they not to be held to a
higher standard in their agency than the standard of conspiratorial confi-
dentiality traditionally sanctioned by the agency concept? Is it also a no-
bility for which the bar should be revered that if society is to advance
toward a higher ethic from which we will all benefit, that lawyers be at
the forefront of this progress instead of impeders of it? No rules of pro-
fessional ethics can or should exempt lawyers from the general legal pro-
scription against wilful blindness to their clients' crimes or reckless par-
ticipation in them. Let us hope that the debate on the confidentiality
canon will continue in this spirit.
See Note, supra note 17, at 980.
